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contemporary society. Understanding these fragilities sharpens the critical 
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Introduction 
 
Why Marxism? And, specifically: Why Marxist educational theory? Through 
exploring these questions in this article it is concluded that Marxism is significant 
as it intellectually disrupts and challenges capitalist society, mainstream social 
science and capital’s educational forms. The article is premised on leaving 
capitalism behind on the basis of a more fully developed communism that 
currently supports capitalist social life. 
The article rests substantially on the work of John Holloway, especially his 
early articles in Common Sense: Journal of the Edinburgh Conference of Socialist 
Economists. On this foundation, it is argued, firstly, that the importance of Marxism 
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resides in its capacity to pinpoint fragilities and weaknesses in the constitution, 
development and rule of capital in contemporary society. Understanding these 
fragilities sharpens the critical edge of any movements aimed at social 
transformation out of the madhouse of capital. Marxist educational theory plays a 
central role in this enterprise, and therefore justifies its intellectual priority.  
These points are illustrated through consideration of the following ideas 
and phenomena: fragility, crisis, and critique. It is argued that fragility must be the 
starting point as Marxism is primarily a theory of capital’s weaknesses, and not the 
opposite: a theory of capitalist domination. Following Holloway, Marxism is a 
theory against society, rather than just another theory of society. Our strength vis-
à-vis capital is also the place for apprehending the fragilities and dependencies of 
labour. This vicious duality also exists in terms of crises in capitalism, and this 
flows into the phenomena of critique, and into the subjects / objects of critique, 
too. 
 The general view in this paper is that capitalism – a crisis-ridden, flawed, 
restless, unforgiving and desperate form of society – needs to be put into the 
dustbin of history, so that we can do more of what we want to do, in a more secure 
social and physical environment that allows the fullest expression of our abilities 
and passions, our creative instincts and positive feelings for others and ourselves. 
This is the embrace of communism.  
 
Fragility 
 
The social condition of labour can be presented as being one of fragility. At 
any point, capital and its human representatives (CEOs, managers, human 
resource departments and so on) can outsource our work, downsize the labour 
force at our place of employment, or fly off to the Far East and the prospects of a 
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cheaper labour force. As unemployed folk, we appear to be at the mercy of the 
capitalist state and its paltry (if applicable) unemployment ‘benefits’, categorised 
as ‘shirkers’ in the right-wing press and forced to take looking for work as a pseudo 
full-time job, all the better to be exploited again for the social force that gets the 
major benefits of our labour: capital.  
These contingencies and precarities of being a worker in capitalism today 
vary in format, intensity and detail as between nations. Yet the key issue is our 
apparent social fragility: capital appears to be so powerful, unforgiving and 
socially justified in its operations (it’s ‘the way things are’, and ‘there is no 
alternative’), and is backed up by the state, police, the courts, a scolding and finger-
pointing media and running dog education system, that fragility by convention 
appears as our social lot. We still appeal to trade unions and political parties, and 
sometimes victories are gained, and our fragility momentarily dissolves into warm 
solidarity, comradeship and the euphoria of collective progressive change. Streets, 
squares and other spaces of resistance may become ours, for moments.  But capital 
and its human representatives, its power, remain; on a global scale. Our fragility is 
reasserted. We cannot seem to shake it off: our precarious state of being returns, 
and is emphasised further when we glance at what capitalist development is doing 
to planet Earth. Furthermore, it seems we have to go on feeding the monster, for it 
appears that: 
If we do not devote our lives to the labour that creates capital, we 
face poverty, even starvation, and often physical repression 
(Holloway, 2010, p.7). 
Even when we articulate the fragilities of capital and resolve to attack these, 
intellectually and practically, this thought can at least make us cautious and often 
debilitate and paralyse. In attacking capital’s weak points we fear this may be 
creating tragic problems for ourselves. 
      Yet it is precisely because of these feelings and intuitions of our weakness 
in the face of the indefatigable and seemingly all-powerful monster that is capital, 
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that we need Marxism. We need it to expose the weak points, the vulnerabilities 
and fragility of capital. This is when Marxism comes to our aid. It helps us 
analytically locate and to practically deepen the weaknesses and fragilities of 
capital. For me, these are the principal arguments for engaging with Marxism 
today. 
 John Holloway came to similar conclusions nearly a quarter of a century ago. 
For, according to Holloway: 
[…] while the other theories [e.g. feminism and Green theory] are 
theories of social domination or oppression, Marxism takes that 
oppression as its starting point. The question of Marxism is not: 
‘how do we understand social oppression?’, but: ‘given that we 
live in an oppressive society, how can we understand the fragility 
of that oppression? (Holloway, 1994, p.39 – emphasis added). 
Thus, although we experience multiple forms of oppression in capitalist 
society – racism, sexism and so on – understanding of the fragility of these forms 
of oppression, their foundations, and disrupting them, is crucial for advancing 
human progress.  
The fragility of capitalism is based first and foremost on the fact that we, as 
labourers, continually create capital and its social formation; capital depends on 
our labour. Thus, notes Holloway (2015a), in effect we are the crisis of and for 
capital. ‘We’, are those who are excluded from the capitalist labour market and 
therefore relatively excluded from various markets for goods, and those whose 
labour-power is expended in a vast array of capitalist labour processes for the 
profit (literally) of capital, and also those engaged in the social reproduction of the 
magical commodity (for capital) that is labour-power (Garland, 2012, p.90). As 
social subjects ‘we’ are the ‘restless movement of negation’ (Holloway, 2009, p.7, 
in Garland, 2012, p.90). The ‘social world is inherently fragile, without fixed and 
ultimate foundations’ (Cordero, 2017, p.1), as ‘we’ never let these solidify on the 
one hand as we struggle against the imperatives and domination of capital, and 
representatives of capital continually seek to remake the force of capital in our 
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world through utilising our labour, intelligence and imagination, on the other. In a 
world of struggle, of course, we cannot ignore our own dependencies and 
weaknesses, but neither should we fail to seek out and exploit the fragilities of 
capital because of these.  
 It is when we move on to explore capitalist education, that we find an 
overwhelming rationale for embracing not just Marxist science in general but 
Marxist educational theory in particular. This is because Marxist educational 
theory exposes the perniciousness and horror of the role of educational 
institutions in capitalist society, whilst also unfolding the most general and serious 
weakness of capital. Labour-power, our capacity to labour, a commodity that is 
bought and sold in the capitalist labour market, and which is owned by labourers 
and periodically used by capitalist enterprises for generating surplus value, is 
internal to personhoods in capitalist society. The generation of capital as more 
capital, its new life as surplus value, rests on the unique, magical commodity that 
is labour-power: the only commodity that creates more value than is represented 
by its continued existence in capitalist society. That this precious commodity 
resides within the persons of labourers in capitalist society is most inconvenient 
for capital and its human representatives! Labourers must be forced, cajoled, 
incentivised and persuaded to expend their wondrous commodity in capitalist 
labour processes to produce more value than is expressed in the wage – to produce 
surplus value, on which capital’s expansion and development depends. 
 In contemporary capitalist society and especially in the most developed 
capitalist countries in Europe and America since the Second World War, but today 
pretty much world-wide, education and training institutions have become 
increasingly involved in the social production of labour-power (see Rikowski 
2002a, pp.131-135, and Rikowski 2002b, pp.193-196 for more on this). Marxism 
is the most advanced theory for understanding and resisting the processes 
involved in the social production of labour-power that we have today. It is best 
placed to understand and critique such siren educational policies such as 
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‘employability’ and apparently ‘progressive’ ideas such as ‘lifelong learning’ which 
can be read as lifelong labour-power production.  
 Furthermore, viewing the role of educational institutions in the social 
production of labour-power through Marxism indicates the real social power of 
teachers in contemporary society. They have a crucial input into the development 
of the unique commodity, labour-power, that the generation and expansion of 
capital through surplus value production is founded on. If labour-power is the fuel 
for the living fire (i.e. labour) then teachers can be viewed as guardians of the 
flame, or angels of the fuel dump – with all the power for subversion, fostering 
alternative visions of society, stimulating hope and the capacity for critique 
amongst students that human representatives of capital dread.  
 
Crisis 
Marxism is the most powerful theory of crisis we have today, and for me this 
is another reason for engaging with Marx and Marxist theory. Crisis in capitalism 
exposes fragilities in the existence and rule of capital – and this flows from an 
interest in uncovering the weaknesses of capital in the previous section of this 
article. Crises in capitalism indicate ‘the power of labour in-against-and-beyond 
capital’, and ‘crisis is the manifestation of that power and for that reason the 
central concept of Marxism’ (Holloway, 1991, p.77). Capitalist society is crisis-
ridden, and ‘crisis is always with us because, for capital, labour is a problem’ 
(Endnotes Collective, 2010, p.4 – original emphasis), and it is ‘the presence of the 
power of labour within capital that makes it ineradicably crisis-ridden’ (Holloway, 
1991, p.74). Crisis is ‘the modus operandi of capital’ (Screamin’ Alice, 2008, p.1).  
This connects with the previous section: the ‘constant tendency to crisis’ 
indicates the instability and fragility of capitalism (Holloway, 1991, p.74) and is a 
manifestation of the power of labour to disrupt the flow of capitalist development 
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(Ibid.). Caffentzis argues that for Marx ‘crisis brings to the surface the truth of the 
capitalist system (2002, p.6); that it has vulnerabilities and an historical shelf life. 
As Frings notes: ‘Every crisis points towards the historical finitude of capitalism’ 
(2009, p.2); and ‘in crisis the impermanence of capitalism becomes clear’ 
(Holloway, 1987, p.55), for crises indicate ‘the “limit experiences” of capitalism, 
when the mortality of the system is felt’ (Midnight Notes Collective, 2009, p.2), and 
on this basis it is clear that crisis is at the ‘core of capitalism’ (Holloway, 1987, p.56; 
and 1992, p.147). 
Marxism is a theory of crisis, a theory of the fragility of capitalism; it does 
not have a theory of crisis (Holloway, 1994, p.39-40). Thus, for those seeking not 
just to struggle against capitalism whilst also living within it, but to go beyond 
capitalism in intellectual endeavours and practical activities, then Marx’s theory, 
which is at its roots a theory of crisis, is invaluable.  
But what constitutes a crisis? And ‘precisely what does it mean to speak of 
‘crisis’?’ (Samman, 2011, p.4). Drawing on an account of crisis in  Rikowski (2015, 
pp.5-9, and 2018, pp.9-10), etymologically the concept of ‘crisis’ comes from the 
Greek noun krisis – denoting some decision, choice or judgement being made 
(Peters, 2013, p.199), and the Greek verb krino, ‘meaning to cut, to select, to decide 
to judge – a root it shares with the term ‘criticism’’ (Osborne, 2010, p.23). This 
outlook on crisis is often traced back to Hippocrates (1983), as doctors are charged 
with the responsibility of making correct decisions and choices regarding the 
health and well-being of patients. In turn, they are also responsible for correct 
diagnoses of diseases and ailments, and effective monitoring of the patient 
following medical intervention. The ‘crisis’ point in disease, for Hippocrates, is a 
turning point in the strength of a disease: when it becomes clear that the patient is 
either on the road to recovery, or faces death or at least severe debilitation (e.g. 
amputation of limbs). As Bill Dunn (2014) notes, invoking ‘crisis’ as starting point 
for social explanation means that recovery needs to be accounted for when this 
occurs.   
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John Holloway (1992), following Hippocrates, argues that ‘crisis’ 
designates:  
A qualitative turning point, a break in the normal process of 
change, is a crisis. The original term ‘crisis’ is medical. In its original 
Greek meaning it referred to a turning point in an illness (p.145 – 
emphasis added).   
The crisis point is that moment when death or recovery hangs in the 
balance. Holloway argues this approach to crisis as turning point can also be 
applied to social scientific and historical studies, and that: 
… crisis does not simply refer to ‘hard times’, but to turning points. 
It directs attention to the discontinuities of history, to breaks in the 
path of development, ruptures in a pattern of movement, 
variations in the intensity of time. (1992, p.146 – emphasis added). 
For Holloway (1992) the concept of crisis is an indispensable aid to 
understanding social and historical change. Crises can recur: a singular crisis can 
appear to have reached a positive turning point only to move into a negative 
direction later on. Thus, although ‘…crisis is a period of intensified change which 
may lead one way or the other’ (Holloway, 1992, p.146 – emphasis added), there 
could be retrogression, a back-tracking and recurrence of the crisis. 
 From its medical roots the notion of crisis can be applied to social 
phenomena, processes and developments. To say that these are in a state of crisis 
is to designate a situation as involving ‘imminent danger and high risk’ (Gamble, 
2009, p.39). This makes quick decisions necessary, often ‘under pressure with very 
incomplete knowledge’ which ‘can lead to very different results’ (Ibid.).  
 In her book, Anti-Crisis (2014), and in an earlier article (2011), Janet 
Roitman argues that ‘crisis’: 
…is a primary enabling blind spot for the production of knowledge. 
Making that blind spot visible means asking questions about how 
we produce significance for ourselves (2011, p.3).  
Crisis is a ‘blind spot’ because we cannot view or grasp it independently of 
the phenomena that appear to constitute a ’crisis’. Thinking about and through the 
concept of crisis becomes an enabling tool for the production of certain kinds of 
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knowledge, especially historical knowledge, although in her 2014 book Roitman 
illustrates its efficacy for social scientific analysis in general.  
 Roitman’s analysis of crisis suggests that the idea of crisis refers to a 
phenomenon without a subject: crisis is merely an effect of a complex set of social 
conjunctures and trends, but has no subject of its own. The centripetal point of this 
social whirlpool is empty, a void. The eye of the social storm cannot be seen: de 
facto it is therefore without content.  The Cambridge English Dictionary (CED) has 
two interesting definitions of ‘blind spot’ for our purposes. The first is that a blind 
spot is: ‘an area that you are not able to see, especially the part a road you cannot 
see when you are driving, behind and slightly to one side of the car’. In this case, 
the viewer is unable to see part of the road, though arranging wing mirrors 
correctly would throw light on the blind spot – a point that was relevant when my 
car was hit by a French coach on the M1 motorway in July 1994! However it is the 
second CED definition that hits home, where a blind spot is: ‘a subject that you find 
very difficult to understand at all, sometimes because you are not willing to try’ 
(emphasis added). On the basis of this second definition, it could be argued that 
Roitman has simply not enquired what the social eye of the storm might be: she 
has not explored what the subject of crisis is, or could be, in good faith. ‘What 
exactly is in crisis?’ (Roitman, 2014, p.49 – original emphasis), she queries. 
Answering this question is pointless, notes Roitman: 
The hasty assumption that some thing is in crisis induces an 
inevitable leap to abstraction because, as I indicated …[previously] 
… crisis, in itself cannot be located or observed as an object of first-
order knowledge. (Ibid.).   
Roitman, whilst ruling out that there could be an object of a particular crisis, 
does consider briefly whether there could be subjects of crises (Roitman, 2014, 
pp.65-70) that can be grasped. However, for Roitman, crisis situations can bring 
about certain experiences that do provide a central social content for crises. She 
notes that the economic crisis of 2007-09 occasioned a ‘crisis of the neoliberal 
subject’, as this crisis was impossible on the basis of neoliberal perspectives on 
economy and society – yet it happened – thereby generating a crisis of neoliberal 
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subjectivity, which people shared to varying degrees, with mainstream economists 
especially feeling the clash of their world view with the social reality of bank 
failures, credit crunches, mortgage defaults, evictions and the other phenomena 
constituting the 2007-09 scenario. But Roitman’s view is that this re-centring 
misreads (and also the unfortunate people embroiled in the 2007-09 crisis 
misread) what happened, for: 
[…] crisis is the unexamined point of departure for narration. It is 
a blind spot for the production of knowledge about what 
constitutes historical significance and about what constitutes 
social or historical meaning … [Therefore] … posited in this way, 
crisis is the point from which hermeneutics or anthropology 
begins: crisis is the means to access both “the social” and 
“experience” because it entails the disclosure of the constitutive 
conditions of human practice (2014, p.66). 
Thus, crisis is a ‘narrative category’ (Roitman, 2014, p.70): the point at 
which a story, a narrative, begins regarding situations we take to be those of 
‘crisis’. The idea of crisis allows us to construct meanings and narratives about 
historical turning points and in these processes we are the ‘subjects of times of 
crisis’ (Roitman, 2014, p.66); the storytellers, the meaning-makers, are the real 
subjects of crises for Roitman.  
 Fortunately, Roitman’s precepts and prolixity come after many others had 
previously advanced perceptible points to, and subjects of, crises. Turning to the 
notion of ‘education crisis’ briefly, the subjects of crisis have been, for example: 
state-financed public education (e.g. Sarup, 1982); education for its own sake (e.g. 
Furedi, 2009; Hodgson, Vlieghe and Zamojski, 2017); the learning society and 
lifelong learning (Wain, 2004), or the school system (Arendt, 1961). Thus, others 
have not succumbed to the second CED definition of ‘blind spot’ and have refused 
to avoid or evade putting forward a subject of education crisis.  
In line with the project of locating the weaknesses and fragilities of capital’s 
domination of our lives, as argued for previously, then the subject of crisis should 
be the most explosive, yet basic and corrosive subject of crisis imaginable: the 
capital relation, the social relation between labour and capital, sometimes referred 
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to as the class relation. This subject of crisis obliterates any ‘blind spot’, and can be 
observed throughout the capitalist social formation – not just in what is viewed as 
the ‘economy’, and especially not just at the point of production, in the capitalist 
labour process. Crises in the capital relation are central to capitalist development, 
as: 
The history if capitalist society is the history of the reproduction of 
the capitalist class relation … [And ] … if we assume the 
reproduction of this relation is not inevitable, what is the 
possibility of its non-reproduction? For a brief moment the recent 
[2007-09] crisis perhaps seemed to present us with a glimpse of 
such non-reproduction (Endnotes Collective, 2010, p.3 – original 
emphasis).   
As Holloway (1987) notes: 
Capitalist crisis is a crisis of the capital relation. It is not a 
“recession” or a “downturn in the economy” although it may 
appear as such; it is a crisis of the relation between the ruling class 
and the exploited class (p.56 – emphasis added).  
For Holloway, this is the ‘fundamental point’ that discussions of crisis 
typically avoid. Crises of capitalist domination are periodically thrown up as, adds 
Holloway, ‘domination is never easy’ and the dominated ‘are alive and resist’ 
(Ibid.). Crisis ‘expresses the structural instability of capitalist social relations, the 
instability of the basic relation between capital and labour on which the society is 
based’ (Holloway, 1992, p. 159); it is a ‘crisis of the capital relation’, that is ‘made 
inevitable by the inherent contradictions of that relation’ (Holloway, and Picciotto, 
1977, p. 92). This is what crisis is: the capital relation is the subject of crisis. A 
theory of crisis is therefore a ‘theory of the volatility of class relations’ (Holloway, 
1992, p.162). But while it is a theory of the breakdown of a pattern of accumulation 
(e.g. the period of neoliberal capitalist rule from the end of the Post-War boom) it 
is also about the ‘reestablishment of class relations’ founded on their restructuring 
across the social formation (with national and regional variations in strategies 
pursued). Thus, in a time of crisis, representatives of the capitalist class seek to 
restructure the capital relation in all of the institutions of society – including 
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education – in favour of capitalist development and attempts at stabilising 
capitalist rule. For Holloway, crisis is the result: 
[…]not of the strength of the working class or of the labour 
movement, necessarily, but of the strength of the general resistance 
to capital’s drive for an ever more profound subordination of 
humanity … (2002, p.39 – emphasis added).  
Nevertheless, overt class struggle (strikes, protests, sit-ins, workers taking 
over factories, sabotage etc.) is an indicator of a clear failure of representatives of 
capital to adequately subsume the wills of labourers, collective labour, under the 
yoke of the imperatives of capital. If a crisis in the capital relation explodes onto 
the streets and into factories and offices then this is a vital message to human 
representatives of capital, but they are also alarmed by everyday forms of 
resistance; for example, relative idleness, coasting, time-wasting (e.g. messing 
about on Facebook) and low-level forms of resistance that nevertheless when 
aggregated indicate capital’s failure to adequately control the labour of workers 
(see Bolchover, 2005, and Paulsen, 2014 – for more on these issues). At particular 
times, the relation of domination ‘comes under strain’ and if this pressure becomes 
intense, shows itself as crisis, heralding dangers for capitalist vitality, and then the 
capital relation has to ‘be restructured if capital is to remain in command’ 
(Holloway, 1987, p.56).     
 
 
Critique 
 
The idea of critique has taken a number of poundings in recent years. Bruno 
Latour flags up that critique has ‘run out of steam’ (2004) on the one hand, and on 
the other Richard Kilminster (2013) points to critique’s overbearing strength and 
argues that, like a kind of intellectual Japanese knotweed, critique has choked off 
signs of human progress and the notion that there are things worth preserving and 
valuing in contemporary society. In short, Kilminster, coming at critique as a 
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sociologist, points to ‘unalloyed overcritique’ in contemporary social science 
where the contrast between society as it is (capitalism) and as it ought to be 
(communism) has become too great (2013, p.5). This leads to an imbalance in 
making judgements about contemporary society, downplaying its ‘achievements 
and benign compulsion’ (p.7).  
Other sociologists have noted the ‘excessiveness’ of critique. For example, 
Bülent Diken (2015) splits critique into radical critique and the sociology of 
critique grounded in a ‘pragmatic sociology’ (p.923). Diken focuses largely on the 
latter, where critique ‘is that which enables us to contemplate our present 
condition in the prism of the possible’ (Ibid.), thereby placing limits on critique 
and corralling off the radical alternative. The sociology of critique focuses ‘on the 
transformations of capitalism’ (p.924), as opposed to seeking out its fragilities 
with a view to exacerbating them. Thus: the sociology of critique ‘reduces all 
critique to reformist critique’ (Diken, 2015, p.930; and Diken, 2012, p.159). When 
he comes to consider radical critique (only briefly, 2015, pp.930-932), Diken 
spends most of his keyboarding on how, in contemporary society, critiques of 
capitalism are absorbed into the social formation and spat out as new forms of 
accommodating people to the rule of capital. Furthermore, for Diken, radical 
critique is ‘utopian’ (Diken, 2012, p.172), which leads him to browse through 
various forms of utopia, and all this is set within a chapter called ‘Critique of 
critique of critique …’ (2012, pp.153-165).  
Much of what Diken has to say appears to be influenced by the work of Luc 
Boltanski and Eve Chiapello (2007) where critique seems futile, pointless, as 
capital’s capacity to absorb and incorporate critique, protest and resistance 
appears to be boundless. Social critique ‘has not seemed so helpless for a century 
as it has been for the last fifteen years’ according to Boltanski and Chiapello (2007, 
p.xxxv). For, as Boltanski and Chiapello see it: 
Capitalism keeps going, and typically overcomes the crises it 
generates, by responding to “critique”, stealing the thunder of its 
critics by answering some of their challenges while diverting 
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attention from other grievances that are either left unremedied or 
exacerbated (Brick, 2009, p.2). 
Taking a neo-Weberian tack, Boltanski and Chiapello argue that as the 
‘spirit’ of capitalism constantly evolves and mutates then radical Left critics of 
capitalism need to keep innovating in their critical analyses. Thus, critique 
becomes a labour of Sisyphus, a treadmill process, forever trying to catch up with 
the cunning metamorphoses of capital, with traditions of anti-capitalism being 
constantly outmoded (Brick, 2009, p.6).   Unsurprisingly, Boltanski’s (2011) later 
analysis of critique indicates that he is approaching it through ‘the concept of social 
domination’ (p.1); that is, starting out from capital’s domination over labour and 
labourers, whereas the opposite perspective, of exploring capital’s weaknesses 
and fragilities through critique, was argued for earlier in this article.  
Where critique is not futile, or useless for significantly impacting on and 
moving beyond the rule of capital, some argue that it is most certainly limited. The 
analyst should focus on the limits of critique (Felski, 2015), its effects on the 
subject or object of critique being too corrosive. For Felski, this is because critique 
manifests aggressiveness where the process of critique and the person 
undertaking it ‘likes to have the last word’ (2015, p.123). Critique is unpleasant! 
This is so even though, argues Felski, it is secondary to what is being critiqued: the 
centre of critique, what is being critiqued, is smothered by analysis. Because 
critique is negative (pp.127-134) it necessarily underplays any worth, merits, or 
beauty possessed by the phenomena being critiqued. The intellectuality of critique 
tends to cut out or undermine any emotional or moral responses to the subject or 
object of critique, hence narrowing the range of human expression (Felski, 2015, 
pp.134-140). Furthermore, as critique ‘comes from below’ (e.g. Marxism, critical 
theory) its historical failure to lead to emancipation causes despair. Additionally, 
as critique purports to speak for the oppressed and downtrodden, once it is taken 
up by academics and Left intellectuals, as it invariably is, its academisation triggers 
‘feelings of resentment’ and complaints of ‘being inaccessible’,  or is ‘irrelevant to 
larger communities of the oppressed’ (Felski, 2015, p.142). From such a 
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perspective on critique it is a short step to flying the flag of ‘postcritique’, which 
Felski unfurls with her collaborator Elizabeth Anker (in Anker and Felski, 2017).    
The ‘critique of critique’ has found its way into educational theory and 
philosophy in recent years. Barbara Applebaum’s (2011) influential article 
consolidated a postcritique trend in the philosophy of education that had been 
hardening for some years. She follows Judith Butler’s idea of ‘suspending 
judgement’ (though not abolishing it altogether) in the process of critique (see 
Butler, 2001). For Applebaum, the main problem is to introduce judgement 
regarding a state of affairs once it has been suspended (2011, p.62). Rather than 
addressing this point, Applebaum makes a plea for Butlerian critique (with its 
suspension, and allied to poststructuralism) to be central to educating students 
about discourses that obscure issues regarding how they gain their knowledge and 
‘who benefits from such practices’ (Ibid.).  
More recently, there has been a related shift towards post-critical 
philosophy of education and post-critical pedagogy, with the work of Naomi 
Hodgson, Joris Vlieghe and Piotr Zamojski fanning the flames of post-critique in 
educational theory and practice (in Hodgson, Vlieghe and Zamojski, 2016, 2017a 
and b, and 2018). These post-critical educational theorists insist that the post-
criticality of their Manifesto ‘is by no means an anti-critical position’ (2017b, p.17), 
but I remain unconvinced, for as Garland has noted, there are ‘multiple standpoints 
for critique’, but: 
…‘post-critique’ is not one of them, seeking as it does to post-date 
the concept without contributing to its development, accepting 
existing society as ‘natural, inevitable and immutable’ (2017, p.1).  
And at this point the ‘critique of critique of critique of the post-post critical’ 
(for education and everything else) is left behind, with a critique of this debilitating 
theoretical melange best reserved for future work. 
 To get back to one of the original questions: why Marxism? I would argue 
that a commitment to Marxism is justified in virtue of the specific form of critique 
that Marxism offers. Before explicating Marxism’s powerful critique, a few 
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preliminary points. First, as Roitman (2014) has argued, crisis and critique are 
‘cognates’: etymologically these two concepts have a common origin, they are like 
conceptual ‘blood relatives’ (see Boland, 2013, p.231 on this point). As Fornäs 
(2013) has pointed out, the idea of critique derives ultimately from the Greek 
kritikos which is concerned with making judgements, deciding right from wrong, 
what is the case is separated from what is not (p.505). This has some overlap with 
the Greek origins of the concept of crisis, as illustrated earlier. Gürses notes that 
‘as an adjective (kritikos) and a verb (krenein)’ these Greek roots indicate acts of 
‘distinguishing, separating, deciding, judging, incriminating – and contending’ 
(2006, p.1 – original emphasis). Gürses goes on to show how critique has origins 
in medical terminology, as does the concept of crisis, which was indicated 
previously in this article. 
Fornäs notes that from the 16th and 17th centuries the notion of critique 
came to denote ‘a more general fault-finding, a negative objection to something’ 
(2013, pp.504-505 – original emphasis), which still has contemporary resonance. 
The concept of critique was then also used in relation to literary and artistic 
productions – which continued to the present day (Fornäs, 2013, p.505). It was 
Immanuel Kant that ‘generalised this aesthetic concept of critique’ which came to 
‘signify any detailed analytical judgement based on ability of distinction, 
differentiation and discrimination’ (Ibid. – emphasis added). In the 19th Century, 
Marx in particular took up the sword of critique to political economy and the 
Frankfurt School of Critical Theory waved it in the direction of cultural analysis in 
the 20th century. The idea of critique grew in strength in all the social sciences, arts 
and humanities from the late 19th century.   
 Having explored some aspects of the contemporary challenges to, and 
origins of, the idea of critique then a return to generating the specific form of 
critique I referred to earlier in this section can now begin. Marxism, for me, does 
not just have a theory of critique, but is a theory of critique: it lives and breathes 
critique; it is a deeply radical critique as it gets to us, to labour and labourers (the 
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radical roots). It demonstrates how our labour is at the base of the concepts and 
ideas that express capital’s domination, the real abstractions and the processes 
they represent and express which we seek to undermine and make weaker, more 
fragile. As Foucault notes ‘critique is a matter of making things more fragile’ (2007, 
p.138), and Marxism is the most powerful theory we have for this enterprise. As 
John Holloway argues: 
[…] the focus on the fragility of capitalism points in the direction of 
exploiting that fragility now, opening up cracks in the texture of 
domination wherever we can (2005, p.273). 
There are three main ways of doing this. First, there can be spaces opened 
up within the belly of the beast, within capital’s social universe: alternatives, 
practical initiatives that seek to clash against the rule of capital and its 
abstractions, especially against abstract labour. These practical activities and 
initiatives seek not to just resist capitalist social life (that is, being against capital) 
but also to constitute themselves as attempts to go beyond it. Secondly, the 
communist impulse can be nurtured within existing capitalist society. That is, how 
we relate to each other differently, forging stronger social relations based on an 
already existing communism-within-capitalism; strengthening the social relations 
of the future by making them stronger today. For Holloway, ‘capitalism is pregnant 
with communism’ (2005, p.271). Thirdly, critique within Marxism is an intellectual 
attack on capitalism; opening up conceptual fragilities, metaphorically jumping on 
the weak points of capital, and shouting about these from the rooftops! This third 
point concerns us here.   
 Yes, but the commodity, value, and abstract labour: how do we exorcise 
these from our social lives? How do we cut these monsters down to size and them 
consign their shattered bodies to the waste disposal unit? Marxist critique 
provides the necessary intellectual machinery. Marxism is a theoretical Large 
Hadron Collider that splits apart the hard, resistant ideas giving form to capital’s 
social universe. In turning on the power for the atomic accelerator we engineer the 
fragmentation of capital’s concepts which appear as ‘crystallizations of the way in 
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which social relations are historically organized’ (Cordero, 2017, p.8). As Neary 
makes clear: 
It is only by fixing these categories, or real abstractions, in their 
actual social substance that they can be disabled of their social 
power and stripped of their authority (2017, p.561).  
We shatter the crystalline ideas that hold capital together, to reveal 
ourselves once the dust has settled; ourselves as the real doers, the organisers and 
creators of a massive social force that oppresses us. The ‘critical interrogation of 
the social substance of capitalist categories’ (Moraitis and Copley, 2017, p.99, 
referring to Marx, 1867, p.174) is the object of Marxist critique. 
Rita Felski notes, disapprovingly: ‘Crrritique! The word flies off the tongue 
like a weapon, emitting a rapid guttural burst of machine-gun-fire’ (2015, p.120); 
but Marxism goes nuclear with critique, and does not mess with machine-guns or 
pea shooters. We have a social universe to intellectually conquer, and another to 
build – simultaneously! We need a dissolution weapon with the power of Marxist 
critique! Marxism as the ultimate intellectual weapon splits open capital’s frozen 
stiff categories to show the power of human action in all its magical wildness, for: 
Take a category, split it open. What do we see? Perhaps more 
categories. Take the commodity, for example, as Marx did. Split is 
open and we discover the antagonistic unity of value and use value 
(Holloway 2012, p.515) … [And] ... Take a category, split it open 
and what we discover is not a philosophical contradiction but a 
living antagonism, a constant struggle, a clash of opposing movings 
(p.517). 
While this particular splitting process yields the tension, the violent relation 
between value (grounded in abstract labour) and use value (expressed in 
commodities), the critique is not radical, does not get to the root of the matter. As 
Holloway argues: 
But that is not enough. We need to go to the core, we need to go ad 
hominem (as Marx insists). We need to reach an understanding of 
the category in terms of human action, going through layer after 
layer of conceptualization if necessary. Why? Because it is only if 
we understand the social world in terms of human action that we 
can pose clearly the questions of what human action is necessary to 
change it (2012, p.515 – emphasis added).   
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Thus, critique drives on until the human content of the categories we are 
shattering is uncovered; it is crucial to show how we (as labour and labourers) 
create and generate capital’s social forms that come to stand against us as ghostly 
but real abstractions that rule our lives. Critique, then, in this sense, is not just an 
academic exercise interrogating discourse, for exposing inconsistencies, 
contradictions, aporias, or maleficent values lurking under expressions of 
seemingly positive virtues. It aims to uncover what humans do in capitalist society, 
what exists underneath the concepts and abstractions that give capital its 
substance and coherence – in order to do different, to communise. The starting 
point for this is to critique ‘unreflected presuppositions’ incorporated in concepts 
with social validity in capitalist society, such as ‘commodity’, ‘value’ and ‘labour’, 
in order to uncover how these constituted forms ‘are forms of human social 
practice’ (Bonefeld, 2005, p.1), in order to show how we create, nurture and 
maintain these social forms, how we keep on making capitalism, as a guide to how 
we might generate alternative social relations and different ways of doing. Thus, 
Marxist critique is a theory of social constitution, how capitalist forms are 
generated and maintained; how capitalism is socially constituted – with ‘us’ at the 
terminus of capitalism and its unravelling. Marx’s critique, and Marxist critique, 
‘has to show the human content, however perverted and debased, of the 
constitutional forms of capital … for there is no form without content’ (Bonefeld, 
2005, p.2).    
 The ‘critique of forms’ (Holloway, 2001, p.66) uncovers the antagonistic 
social relations constituting them but we also see ourselves as the ‘negated subject’ 
(Ibid.), for: 
Capital depends on the doing which it denies: therein lies the force 
of hope which exists in the mode of being denied, therein lies hope 
(Holloway, 2001, p.68).  
Our mode of existence might be denied in capital’s social universe, but we 
are always there; capital cannot shake us off, and more to the point is dependent 
on our labour for its existence. Marx’s Capital is: 
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[…] a critique of the categories of political economy, but the same 
principles apply to a critique of religion, or politics, or sociology, or 
gender studies, or whatever: the question is always how do we 
understand the existence of the categories ad hominem, on the 
basis of the way in which human activity is organized (Holloway, 
2012, p.516).  
Of course, education could be added to Holloway’s list of categories. 
However, there are a number of considerations here – that will be taken up in 
future work in more depth.  
First, it is not clear what the starting point should be for a critique of 
capitalist education. For many years now, I have been interested in the question of 
what makes capitalist education capitalist education: what is the form that 
education takes in capitalist society? It seems to me that education in capitalist 
society is currently in the process of being capitalised; that is, becoming capital. 
Marx notes in the Grundrisse (1858) that, regarding capital, it is necessary to 
explore the ‘conditions and presuppositions of the becoming, of the arising’ of 
capital, and this presupposes ‘precisely that it is not yet in being, but merely in 
becoming (p.459 – original emphases). This is all the more so for education as in 
many of the most developed capitalist countries the state plays a significant role 
in education today; education, in many institutions, has not been fully subsumed 
under the orbit of capital as value-generating activity. Holloway argues that in the 
critique of capitalism: 
We take the commodity for the sake of familiarity, but we could 
have started anywhere (2012, p.516). 
Thus: we could have started with education in capitalism on this basis. Yet 
later on in the same article Holloway argues that: ‘In the centre of critique is the 
opening of the most important atom of all: labour’ (2012, p.517 – emphasis added), 
and more recently Holloway has argued that ‘wealth’ (abundance, or richness) is 
the real starting point for analysis in Marx’s Capital, on the basis of the opening 
sentence (as opposed to the commodity) (see Holloway, 2015b and 2017).  
Eighteen years ago, I argued that the starting point for an understanding 
and critique of capitalist education was labour-power as a commodity (Rikowski, 
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2000). When Marx ‘split the commodity’ in Capital he got to value, exchange-value 
(as the form of appearance of value) and use-value, and further splits led to labour 
and thence to concrete and abstract labour. It seemed to me that uncovering 
labour-power as a commodity, or ‘splitting’ it in Holloway’s terms would get me to 
the human content in its social production the social production of labour-power, 
where capitalist education plays a part (perhaps the main part) in the social 
production of labour-power, and the labour involved in the social production of 
labour-power would, therefore, form the human practices involved in this form of 
production. But further studies of commodity forms suggested I was at most half 
right: I had not considered capitalist education as a milieu for the formation of the 
general class of commodities (see Rikowski, 2000, pp.27-31) within educational 
institutions in contemporary capitalism. Work from 2001-2006 indicated that 
there were two starting points for the critique of capitalist education (for example, 
Rikowski 2001, 2003 and 2005); two commodity forms that opened up the 
concepts necessary for such a critique: labour-power (the unique value-creating 
commodity), and the general class of commodities. In the case of private for-profit 
schools and universities, these two commodity forms and their development work 
in tandem.  Rikowski (2018) expands on these points.    
    
Conclusion 
This article presupposes that we are committed to the termination and 
transcendence of capitalist society, including its educational forms as capitalist 
education. Therefore, Marxism in this light becomes a radical science that 
intellectually disrupts and ruptures capitalist society and its educational forms, 
whilst simultaneously creating alternative social arrangements that seek 
foundations within non-capitalist social relations, and this is inclusive of 
educational formations. In this light, Marxism is a theory par excellence for us as: 
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First, Marxism is the most fully developed theory adequate to the task of 
intellectually locating weaknesses in the rule of capital; this is what Marxism can 
do better and more comprehensively than any other theory. It is precisely because 
of our feelings of weakness in the face of capital that we need Marxism: it gives us 
the capacity to locate capital’s fragilities however ferocious, aggressive and 
monolithic it appears. Specifically in relation to capitalist education, in 
contemporary society education is involved in the social production of labour-
power: the single commodity that fuels the expansion of capital as it is transformed 
into labour in the capitalist labour process and produces new value, surplus-value. 
This is a massive vulnerability for capital, as we, us labourers and potential 
labourers (e.g. students, the unemployed and the whole of the Reserve Army of 
Labour) possess this magical commodity within our personhoods, yielding the 
source of our power, the power of labour, and the social power of teachers who 
have significant inputs into the social production of labour-power. Teachers have 
the capacity to subvert, to put in question the reduction of education to the social 
production of labour power. They can also devise alternative, co-operative forms 
of education where labour-power production for capital is critiqued and 
denigrated. For me, these considerations alone would be enough for embracing 
Marxism in general and Marxist educational theory in particular.  
Secondly, Marxism is the most powerful theory of crisis we have today. 
Crisis in capitalism exposes fragilities in the existence and rule of capital, and for 
me this is crucial for us labourers, ourselves as labour, as capital is dependent on 
us yet we can free ourselves from it and survive and thrive through revelling in the 
communist impulse, the communising dance. This embrace of crisis includes 
grasping how crises in education can become crises for capital (Rikowski, 2018). 
Marxism is a theory of crisis; capitalist crises have at their centre capitalist social 
relations, and these are the subject of capitalist crises, and reveal a failure of capital 
to control labour adequately for its expansion and vitality.  
 
 
 
Cadernos GPOSSHE On-line, v. 1, n.1, 2018.   
 
164 
Thirdly, Marxism is not just a theory of critique, a way of critiquing or some 
kind of methodology, it is critique. Marxism is critique; the relentless critique of ‘all 
that exists’ (Marx, 1843) in capitalist society. Because it dissolves all of capital’s 
social forms and phenomena in critique it can point the way towards the kinds of 
social life we can build when excluding capitalist social relations. We can build 
these new lives now, and we have done some of this work already as communism 
already exists as a suppressed form of life within capitalist society. We do not have 
to wait for the ‘right conditions’ to appear as they have been with us for some time! 
The critique of capital’s educational forms, especially its commodity-forms has 
hardly begun, but the work that has been done so far indicates that, if we are to 
create the kinds of educational forms that we say we want, then we have to develop 
alternatives to ‘education by the state’ – and these are beginning to emerge.      
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